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TRADEMARK LAW-THE LANHAM TRADEMARK AcT-THIRD CIRCUIT
REFUSES TO HOLD ATrORNEYS LIABLE FOR "WRONGFUL"
Ex PARTE SEIZURES
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co., Inc. v. Cullen (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks play a vital role in our society.' They serve as a symbol
of a manufacturer's reputation and as a valuable source of product infor-
mation for consumers. 2 However, trademark counterfeiting, which in-
volves "selling or .. .trafficking goods or services through the use of
spurious trademarks," 3 undermines the role of trademarks. 4 Specifi-
1. See S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3629 (discussing importance of trademarks to consumers
and manufacturers in our society); see also JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAw OF TRADE-
MARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1-4, 15-16 (3d ed. 1917) (tracing
evolution and importance of trademark law from ancient Greece); Edward S.
Rogers, Some Historical Matters Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29, 29-32
(1910-11) (discussing historical importance of trademarks dating back to ancient
Roman, Egyptian and Greek empires).
Trademarks have been defined as "any word, name, symbol, device or any
combination thereof used by a manufacturer or retailer of a product, in connec-
tion with that product, to help consumers identify that product as different from
the products of competitors." MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 289 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
2. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 3-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
3629. The Senate Report states that trademarks represent the manufacturer's
established reputation and ensure that satisfied consumers will continue to asso-
ciate this trademark with quality when making future purchases. Id. at 3. Fur-
thermore, the Report notes that consumers "can not investigate .. .every
product they buy." Id. Therefore, trademarks serve as a reliable source of infor-
mation for consumers about the quality of a manufacturer's product. Id.
3. Id. at 3. The Lanham Trademark Act defines "counterfeit mark" as:
(i) a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal regis-
ter in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether
or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so
registered; or (ii) a spurious designation that is identical with, or sub-
stantially indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the reme-
dies of this chapter are made available . . .but such term does not
include any mark or designation used on or in connection with goods
or services of which the manufacture or producer was, at the time of the
manufacture or production in question authorized to use the mark or
designation for the type of goods or services so manufactured or pro-
duced, by the holder of the right to use such mark or designation.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(l)(B) (1988).
4. See S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
3630. First, the SenateJudiciary Committee recognized that trademark counter-
feiting defrauds consumers who believe they are purchasing a product with the
level of quality they normally associate with a particular manufacturer's product,
(1338)
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cally, counterfeiting leads to serious economic injury to the trademark
owner and poses a threat to the public's health and safety. 5 By offering
the public a lower-priced product, trademark counterfeiters swindle
sales from reputable manufacturers. 6 By offering goods that are of
much lower-quality than those sold by reputable manufacturers, trade-
mark counterfeiters also swindle the unsuspecting public. 7
To deter counterfeiters, Congress enacted the Lanham Trademark
Act, which imposes civil penalties for registered trademark counterfeit-
ing.8 As originally enacted, the Lanham Act authorized courts to issue
injunctions or award damages for trademark infringement. 9 However,
these penalties proved to be unsuccessful in deterring counterfeiting ac-
tivities.' 0 Therefore, in 1984 Congress amended the Lanham Act to
give courts the authority to issue exparte seizures for counterfeit goods
and related materials.I I Recognizing the severity of this remedy, Con-
when they are actually purchasing a lesser-quality fake. Id. at 3-4. Second,
trademark counterfeiting results in lost sales for manufacturers and harms the
manufacturers' reputations. Id. at 4. Third, manufacturers may suffer a loss of
goodwill because of trademark counterfeiting. Once a trademark becomes asso-
ciated with an inferior counterfeit product, it is often impossible to determine
the damage that has been done to the goodwill and the amount of sales lost.
Anthony F. LoCicero, Litigating Trademark Cases, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: LITIGATING COPY-
RIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 1991 1, 15 (1991).
5. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3630.
Counterfeit products often pose a serious threat to public health and safety. Id.
For example, in 1977, the Federal Aviation Administration discovered that faulty
fire detection systems were counterfeited as "Boeing" equipment and installed
in approximately 100 aircraft. Id. (citing 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 149-54
(1982)). Likewise, in 1980, a court found that faulty counterfeit helicopter parts
caused several pilots to lose control, resulting in numerous injuries and fatali-
ties. Id. at 4 (citing Textron Inc. v. Aviation Sales Inc., No. 77 Civ. 1317 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 1980)).
6. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3630.
7. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117.
10. H.R. REP. No. 997, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984). For example, the
International Trade Commission found that sales lost to foreign product coun-
terfeiting rose $11.7 million from 1980 to 1982. Id. at 5 (citing UNITED STATES
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1479, THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PRODUCT COUN-
TERFEITING ON U.S. INDUSTRY (1984)).
11. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2179-83 (1984)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1988)). The ex
parte seizure order is available to registered trademark owners ("registrants") in
civil causes of action against persons who use any "reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation" of a trademark in connection with the sale, distribu-
tion or advertising of goods or services which is likely to confuse the public. 15
U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a). See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 6. Congress en-
acted the Trademark Counterfeiting Act to amend the Lanham Act and "provide
increased sanctions for the counterfeiting of certain registered trademarks." Id.
at 4.
One commentator has asserted that these amendments to the Lanham Act
19931 1339
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gress also incorporated a cause of action for victims of "wrongful"
seizure into 15 U.S.C. section 1116(d)(11) of the newly amended Act.' 2
Specifically, section 1116(d)(1 1) provides that "[a] person who suffers
damage by reason of a wrongful seizure ... has a cause of action against
the applicant for the order under which such seizure was made .... ,,13
The language of section 11 16(d)(11) raises two liability issues. The
first issue is whether the term "applicant" refers only to the party whose
trademark is allegedly being counterfeited, or whether it also encom-
passes that party's attorney.' 4 The second issue is whether the com-
mon-law theory of aiding and abetting liability can be applied to an
applicant's attorney under this section.' 5
One district court, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, has addressed the first issue-whether the term appli-
cant used in section 11 16(d)(11) encompasses a party's attorney. In
Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 16 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois concluded that where the ex parte order is sought
in bad faith, section 11 16(d)(l 1) of the Lanham Act applies not only to
the party seeking the ex parte order, but also to the party's attorney.' 7
The Third Circuit was the first court to address the second issue of
whether aiding and abetting liability can be applied to an applicant's at-
torney under section 11 16(d)(11).
(Trademark Counterfeiting Act) "signaled a new era in the fight against counter-
feiters." J. Joseph Bainton, Reflections on the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984:
Score a Few for the Good Guys, 82 TRADEMARK REP. I (1992)[hereinafter Bainton I].
In particular, Bainton believes the amendments changed trademark law in two
ways: 1) Congress began to treat a trademark as a piece of property, the theft of
which is a crime; and 2) Congress began to view trademark infringers differently
by imposing sanctions for violations other than contempt of court. Id. at 7.
12. Lanham Trademark Act § 34(d)(1 1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 16(d)(l 1) (1988)); see H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 25. The House
Judiciary Committee noted that it had created detailed procedures to govern
and protect defendants who have been damaged by "wrongful" ex parte
seizures. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 16(d)(l1). Section I I16(d)(l1) further provides that a
person who suffers damage as a result of a wrongful seizure may recover dam-
ages for lost profits, cost of materials and reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. The
plaintiff may also recover punitive damages if the applicant sought the seizure in
bad faith. Id.
14. See, e.g., Skierkewicz v. Gonzales, 711 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(holding attorney liable as applicant for wrongful seizure under § 11 16(d)(l 1)).
For a further discussion of whether the term applicant as used in § 11 16(d)(11)
encompasses a party's attorney, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
15. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1992)(holding that common law theory of aiding and abetting liability does not apply
under § 1116(d)(11)).
16. 711 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
17. Id. The Gonzalez court found that there is no conditional privilege
under Illinois law that protects an attorney who has acted wrongfully in an ex
parte seizure order in violation of § 11 16(d)(l 1). Id. at 934-35. For a further
discussion of the Gonzalez decision, see infra notes 43-46.
lB40
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Recently, the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to address
both of these issues. 18 In Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen,19 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, in a civil
action under the Lanham Trademark Act, a party's attorney cannot be
an applicant under section 11 16(d) (11) of the Act.20 Furthermore, the
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court concluded that the common-law doc-
trine of aiding and abetting liability does not apply to a statute like the
Lanham Act, which expressly limits liability to a small class of
defendants. 2 '
This Casebrief analyzes attorney liability under the Lanham Trade-
mark Act and the Third Circuit's treatment of attorney liability under
section 11 16(d)(11). The next section of this Casebrief discusses the
legislative history of the Lanham Trademark Act, focusing on Congress'
reasoning for incorporating ex parte seizure provisions into section
11 16(d) (1 1) of the Act. 22 This section also introduces the issue of aid-
ing and abetting liability. 23 Then, section III discusses the facts and
procedural history of Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen.24 Next,
section IV analyzes the Third Circuit's reasoning in concluding that an
attorney cannot be a defendant under the Lanham Act. 2 5 Finally, this
Casebrief concludes with an analysis of the impact the Electronic Labora-
tory Supply Co. v. Cullen decision is likely to have on the use of the ex parte
seizure provision of the Lanham Act.
26
II. BACKGROUND
In 1984, Congress amended the Lanham Trademark Act to include
an ex parte seizure provision. 27 Congress realized that the civil penal-
ties authorized in the original Act were having little impact on the vol-
18. See, e.g., Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798 (3d Cir.
1992).
19. 977 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of the facts of
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co., see infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
20. 977 F.2d at 803-05.
21. 977 F.2d at 807-08. For a further discussion of the Electronic Laboratory
Supply Co. court's analysis, see infra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the legislative history of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act, see infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of aiding and abetting liability under the Lan-
ham Trademark Act, see infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Elec-
tronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen, see infra notes 57-90 and accompanying
text.
25. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see infra notes
91-133 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of the impact of Electronic Laboratory Supply
Co. v. Cullen, see infra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
27. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 § 34(d), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2179 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1988)). See H.R. REP.
No. 997, supra note 10, at 4.
4
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ume of trademark counterfeiting. 28 Counterfeiters were not deterred by
the threat of an injunction. Instead, when courts gave counterfeiters no-
tice that their fraudulent actions had been discovered, the counterfeiters
disposed of or destroyed the fraudulent goods, thereby making it impos-
sible for the trademark owner to successfully adjudicate a complaint.2 9
Therefore, Congress designed the ex parte seizure provision to alleviate
this problem and to allow trademark owners to seize the counterfeit
goods before the counterfeiters could dispose of or destroy them.
30
28. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 5. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee noted that the remedies available to combat counterfeiting were inade-
quate. Id. Counterfeiting activities were growing to include cosmetics,
pharmaceuticals, heart pacemakers and aircraft parts in addition to the tradition-
ally-counterfeited designer products. Id. Further, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
testified before the SenateJudiciary Committee that "it is generally believed that
several billion dollars of counterfeit goods are sold annually." S. REP. No. 526,
supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3631. The Senate Committee
noted that many counterfeiters viewed civil penalties as a cost of doing business,
which is "a cost they can well afford, given the enormous profits to be made by
capitalizing on the reputations, development costs, and advertising efforts of
honest manufacturers at little expense to themselves." Id. at 5.
Additionally, one commentator has asserted that if courts had vigorously
enforced trademark rights prior to the Lanham Act amendments, then counter-
feiting networks would not have become so powerful as to threaten public
safety. Bainton I, supra note 11, at 6.
29. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 2-3, 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N.
at 3633. The Senate Judiciary Committee found that many commercial counter-
feiters prevented courts from exercising jurisdiction. Id. Once the counterfeit-
ers' actions have been discovered, the counterfeiters generally testify: "I bought
only a few pieces from a man I never saw before and whom I have never seen
again. All my business was in cash. I do not know how to locate the man from
whom I bought and I cannot remember the identity of the persons to whom I
sold." Id. at 7 (citing In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1979)). The
problem of evading jurisdiction existed in Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. Crown Hand-
bags, 492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), in which the plaintiff was unable to
find any evidence of the defendant's counterfeit activities, and as a result was
awarded damages equalling the profits the defendant made on the sale of only six
counterfeit articles that were in the defendant's possession. Id. at 1078.
30. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
3633; see also J. Joseph Bainton, Seizure Orders: An Innovative Judicial Response to the
Realities of Trademark Counterfeiting, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 459, 462-63 (1983) [here-
inafter Bainton II]. Bainton discusses the importance of the ex parte seizure of a
counterfeiter's bogus merchandise and all records relating to this merchandise.
Id. at 464. In particular, Bainton explains that experience has shown that de-
struction or concealment of these goods and records frustrates "implementation
of the trademark owner's statutory and common law rights." Id. However, as a
result of the ex parte seizure provision, the trademark owner's rights are pre-
served and the extent to which the counterfeiter has infringed on them can be
adequately assessed through accelerated discovery. Id.
Another commentator has explained that ex parte seizure derives from the
common-law writ of replevin, which has been used extensively in the common
law, and whose purpose is to restore possession of a disputed chattel to the
plaintiff during pendency of the action. Brian J. Kearney, Note, The Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984: A Sensible Legislative Response to the Ills of Commercial Coun-
terfeiting, XIV FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 156-57 (1986). Kearney further notes that
1342
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Subsequently, Congress promulgated uniform procedures for ob-
taining an ex parte seizure in section 11 16(d). 3 1 According to section
11 16(d), a court must examine sworn affidavits and other relevant evi-
dence before issuing an ex parte seizure order. 32 This evidence must
convince the court that the counterfeit goods are at a specified location
and that the plaintiff (trademark owner) will suffer irreparable harm if
the goods are not seized. 3 3 While recognizing the need for a strong
remedy, Congress also recognized that ex parte seizures must be em-
ployed with caution. 34 Thus, Congress emphasized that ex parte
seizures must not "be employed routinely or casually. ' ' 35 Instead, Con-
the modern ex parte seizure order protects the status quo. Id. This is very im-
portant in trademark cases because after defendants are given notice of an im-
pending civil action, they often flee the jurisdiction or take other action which
makes it impossible to obtain a judgment. Id. at 157-58. Another commentator
has described the goal of trademark litigation. See GLEN E. WESTON ET AL., UN-
FAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 251 (5th ed. 1992)(stating
that goal of trademark litigation is to put counterfeiter out of business and to
settle).
31. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2179-83 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1988)). Congress
intended these procedures to provide plaintiffs in trademark counterfeiting
cases with a remedy so that plaintiffs would not have to rely on "the vagaries of
the common law." H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 6.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3)-(4). The relevant text of § 1116(d) provides
that:
The application for an order under this subsection shall be based
on an affidavit or the verified complaint establishing facts sufficient to
support the findings .of fact and conclusions of law required for such
order ... [and][t]he court shall not grant such an application unless ...
the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts that an order
other than an ex parte seizure order is not adequate to achieve the pur-
poses . . . [and] the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the
person against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or
services; an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure
is not ordered; the matter to be seized will be located at the place iden-
tified in the application; the harm to the applicant of denying the appli-
cation outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person
against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application;
and the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons act-
ing in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or other-
wise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were
to proceed on notice to such person.
Id.
33. Id.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 6. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee recognized the seriousness of the counterfeiting problem and the neces-
sity of the ex parte seizure provision. Id. However, the House Judiciary
Committee emphasized that the use of this provision must be limited. Id.
Otherwise, current courts would use other civil provisions to address such con-
duct. Id. at 6-7.
35. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
3634. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted, in particular, that it would be
inappropriate to issue such an order "when the defendant is a reputable
6
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gress intended for courts to authorize ex parte seizures for "only the
most egregious conduct."3 6
Therefore, to deter abuse of ex parte seizures, Congress provided
remedies for victims of "wrongful" ex parte seizures in section
11 16(d)(11) of the Lanham Act.3 7  Section 11 16(d) (11) permits a de-
fendant to sue the applicant for the damages resulting from a wrongful
ex parte seizure.38  A defendant who proves that there has been a
wrongful ex parte seizure under section 11 16(d)(l 1) can recover dam-
ages for lost profits, cost of materials, unjust enrichment, loss of good
will, attorney's fees and other damages the court deems appropriate. 39
merchant, absent unusual circumstances." Id. at 15. The Committee reasoned
that such a merchant "would not be likely to destroy or conceal counterfeit
goods or ... act to frustrate the court's jurisdiction." Id. Therefore, in such a
case an applicant will not be granted an ex parte seizure order. Id.
Furthermore, the HouseJudiciary Committee noted that judicial orders for
ex parte seizures "present substantial constitutional issues." H.R. REP. No. 997,
supra note 10, at 16. It is thus essential that the defendant, who is not present at
the seizure hearing, be accorded all possible protections against improper
seizure of his or her property." Id.
36. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 6. In an attempt to limit the use of
the ex parte provision, Congress intended to exclude certain activities from the
scope of § 1116(d). Id. at 7. One of these activities is "grey" marketing goods.
Id. In grey marketing, a designated manufacturer legitimately makes trade-
marked articles overseas, but then distributes them "outside the trademark
owner's desired distribution channels." Id. Such activities are not subject to the
sanctions in § 1116(d). Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(1 1). The SenateJudiciary Committee strongly be-
lieved that a victim of a seizure should be entitled to damages if the remedies
provided in the Act (ex parte seizure) are "used as part of a scheme to control
the resale prices" of non-counterfeit goods or to prevent the sale of these goods
in foreign markets. S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3634. Furthermore, the Committee noted that Congress had
explicitly incorporated all of the protections of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure into the Lanham Act to provide additional protection when a court autho-
rizes the use of ex parte seizures. Id. at 7.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11). Congress incorporated this provision to en-
sure that the due process rights that defendants are entitled to under the federal
Constitution, such as notice, are not guaranteed before an ex parte seizure.
H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 25. For the language of § 11 16(d)(l 1), see
supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(11). Congress deliberately refrained from defining
the phrase "wrongful seizure." H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 25. Con-
gress decided to permit the courts to determine whether a seizure was wrongful
based on the circumstances of each particular case. Id. However, Congress did
enumerate at least three specific situations that it intended the courts to treat as
wrongful. Id.
First, a seizure is wrongful if the applicant acts in bad faith in obtaining the
ex parte order. Id. For example, if the applicant seeks an ex parte seizure order
to regulate pricing by decreasing the competition, the seizure will be considered
wrongful. Id. Second, a seizure is wrongful if the matter seized is not counter-
feit. Id. The plaintiff's good faith is not a defense in this case because the de-
fendant is the less culpable of the two parties. Id.
Finally, an ex parte seizure may be wrongful if executed improperly, regard-
less of the nature of the goods and the bad faith of the defendant. Id. For in-
1344 [Vol. 38: p. 1338
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A. "Applicant" Under Section I 1I6(d)(1 1)
An important issue concerning section 1116(d)(11)'s implementa-
tion is the appropriate interpretation of the term "applicant." There
has been confusion over whether the term applicant includes a party's
attorney. 40 In section 1127, the Lanham Act defines the term applicant
as embracing the "legal representatives, predecessors, successors and
assigns of such applicant or registrant."'4 1 However, the Lanham Act
also provides that if a contrary meaning is plainly apparent from the text
of another section of the Act, the former definition will not apply.4 2
Thus, the issue is whether the text of section 11 16(d)(11) provides a
definition of applicant that is contrary to the definition explicitly set
forth in section 1127 of the Lanham Act.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
confronted this issue in Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez.4 3 The Gonzalez court held
that an attorney can be a defendant in a wrongful ex parte seizure action
under section 11 16(d)(11). 4 4 The Gonzalez court reasoned that section
11 16(d)(11) does not explicitly or implicitly provide a conditional privi-
lege for an attorney who has been accused of wrongful seizure. 4 5 In
stance, if the defendant's property is unnecessarily destroyed or if the trademark
owner violates a court order prohibiting access to the defendant's business
records, the seizure is wrongful. Id. at 25-26.
40. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 801-05 (3d Cir.
1992). For a further discussion of whether the term "applicant" under
§ 11 16(d)(l 1) includes a party's attorney, see infra notes 40-46, 78-89 and ac-
companying text.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
42. Id. Specifically, § 1127 states: "In the construction of this chapter, un-
less the contrary is plainly apparent from the context ... [t]he term[] applicant
... embrace[s] the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of
such applicant." Id.
43. 711 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Il. 1989).
44. Id. at 935. In Gonzalez, the court granted the defendant attorneys an ex
parte seizure order for their client, even after the attorneys made numerous mis-
representations to the judge presiding over the ex parte hearing. Id. at 933.
After the court granted the order, the victims of the seizure filed a motion to
vacate the seizure order and for return of their goods. Id. In his Memorandum
Opinion and Order, the judge stressed that he would not have ordered the ex
parte seizure had he known that the defendants were falsely portraying the
plaintiffs as counterfeiters. Id. However, despite the fact that defendant attor-
neys made misrepresentations to obtain the ex parte seizure order, the judge
found it necessary to issue a preliminary injunction. Id. Plaintiffs then filed a
complaint against the defendant attorneys in which the plaintiffs sought dam-
ages pursuant to the wrongful seizure provision of the Lanham Act. Id.
45. Id. at 934. The Gonzalez court noted that Congress had enacted
§ 11 16(d) (1 1) to prevent abuse by persons applying for ex parte seizure orders.
Id. The Gonzalez court held that "[section] 11 16(d)(l 1) does not explicitly or
implicitly require the plaintiff to show the applicant acted with malice . . .even
where the applicant was an attorney allegedly acting on his client's behalf." Id.
Thus, the Gonzalez court held that there is no malice requirement under
§ 11 16(d) (1 1) of the Act. Id. One commentator has asserted that reading a mal-
ice requirement into § 11 16(d)(l 1) would hinder the purpose of deterring "ap-
1993] 1345
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/18
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1338
concluding that an attorney can be liable for wrongful seizure, the Gon-
zalez court implicitly found that there was not an alternate meaning of
applicant in the text of section 1116(d) (11) that was contrary to the defi-
nition provided in section 1127 of the Act. 46 Before the Third Circuit's
decision in Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen, the Gonzalez court had
been the only court to address the issue of whether an attorney is an
applicant under section 11 16(d) (1 1).
B. Aiding and Abetting Liability
The common-law theory of aiding and abetting imposes liability
upon those who assist an illegal venture while refraining from commit-
ting the direct act that constitutes the offense. 4 7 Courts have applied
aiding and abetting liability to several federal statutes.4 8 Generally,
however, courts have limited aiding and abetting liability primarily to
criminal offenses.
In the Third Circuit, courts have extended aiding and abetting lia-
bility in some circumstances to permit civil theories of recovery. 49 First,
in Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America,50 the Third Circuit ap-
plied aiding and abetting liabilty to permit a civil theory of recovery
under a federal RICO statute. 5' The Petro-Tech court concluded that
Congress intended aiding and abetting liability to apply to civil actions
plicants" from seeking orders except when absolutely necessary. See Bainton I,
supra note 11, at 22 n.101.
46. 711 F. Supp. at 934. According to § 1127 of the Lanham Act, the term
applicant includes an attorney unless a contrary meaning appears in the text of
the relevant provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. In concluding that applicant includes
an attorney under § 11 16(d)(l 1), the Gonzalez court implicitly found no contrary
definition in the text of § 11 16(d)(l 1). 711 F. Supp. at 934. For the relevant
text of § 1127, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. For the relevant
text of § 11 16(d)(l 1), see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Specifically, § 2 provides that:
[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal .... [and] [w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done
which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
Id.
48. For example, aiding and abetting liability has been applied to RICO,
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. See Petro Tech v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987)
(applying aiding and abetting liability to Rico); Monsen v. Consolidated Dress
Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-802 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (not-
ing that every circuit to address issue has applied aiding and abetting to securi-
ties violations).
49. See Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356-58 (applying aiding and abetting lia-
bility to civil action under federal RICO).
50. 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987). The statute in question in Petro-Tech was
the federal civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). Id. at 1351.
51. Id. at 1356-58.
1346
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because courts applied such liability to the same misconduct in criminal
actions under RICO.52
Second, the Third Circuit has also allowed civil recovery under the
theory of aiding and abetting as contained in the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. 53 The Third Circuit applied aiding and abetting
liability to civil actions under the 1934 Act because many courts have
applied such liability to criminal actions brought under the statute for
the same offenses. 5 4 Thus, the Third Circuit found that the application
of aiding and abetting liability "logically followed" congressional
intent.5 5
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has not extended aiding and abet-
ting liability to all civil statutes. For example, the Third Circuit has de-
clined to extend such liability to federal civil statutes where the statute
expressly imposes liability on a small class of defendants for narrowly
defined misconduct. 56 Prior to Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen,
no court has ever addressed aiding and abetting liability as applied to
section 11 16(d) (1 1) of the Lanham Trademark Act.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC LABORATORY
SUPPLY CO. V. CULLEN
Electronic Laboratory Supply Corporation (ELSCO) purchases
scrap electronic parts from manufacturers of electronic equipment and
smelts these parts to retrieve the valuable metals contained therein. 5 7
From 1980 to 1988, ELSCO contracted with Motorola, Inc. to remove
scrap semiconductors from Motorola facilities and to destroy them
within thirty days. 58 Motorola contracted to have this "scrap" destroyed
"to protect its reputation and intellectual property rights."'59 These
semiconductors either contained defects or had an expired shelf life. 60
In 1988, Motorola discovered that its scrap semiconductors, which
52. Id. at 1356-62. For a further discussion of the facts and holding of Petro-
Tech, see infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
53. See Monsen v. Consolidated Dress Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-802 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978)(finding that every circuit court to address
the question has held aiding and abetting liability for securities laws violations).
Notably, both RICO and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are federal
criminal statutes, unlike the Lanham Act, which is civil.
54. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 805 (1992).
55. Id.
56. See Craftmatic Sec. Co. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 636-37 (3d Cir.
1989)(citing Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2076-81 (1988))(setting forth prin-
ciples for imposing aiding and abetting liability). For a further discussion of the
principles Craftmatic set forth, see infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
57. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 799 (1992).
58. Id. ELSCO, according to the terms of the contract, had to provide Mo-
torola with a certificate of destruction within thirty days of removal. Id.
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should have been destroyed, were being sold as first-quality Motorola
electronic equipment. 6 1 After an investigation, Motorola suspected that
ELSCO was illegally selling Motorola's scrap. 62 To confirm its suspi-
cions, Motorola visited ELSCO's facilities to inventory the Motorola
scrap material on ELSCO's premises. 63 After comparing the amount of
scrap that Motorola had originally sold to ELSCO with the amount of
scrap ELSCO had smelted or still had on its premises, Motorola deter-
mined that ELSCO could account for at least ninety-eight percent of the
Motorola scrap ELSCO had purchased.64 However, Motorola pro-
ceeded to visit ELSCO a second time to verify its tabulations. 65
Although Motorola again found that ELSCO could account for most of
the Motorola scrap it had purchased, Motorola filed a complaint for
trademark infringement against ELSCO. 66 The complaint alleged that
ELSCO had been improperly selling scrap semiconductors as first-qual-
ity Motorola semiconductors. 67
Simultaneously, Motorola applied for an ex parte order to seize
both the Motorola scrap in ELSCO's possession and "various ELSCO
business records," in accordance with section 1116(d)(11) of the Lan-
ham Act. 68 Motorola submitted the affidavit of Charles Rawles, an EL-
SCO employee that ELSCO had fired for theft, in support of the
order. 69 This affidavit alleged that ELSCO had sold the Motorola scrap
and had deceived the Motorola investigators. 70 The district court
granted the ex parte seizure order, and federal marshalls subsequently
seized most of ELSCO's inventory and held it in a private storage
facility. 7'
61. Id. This scrap was being sold as original Motorola equipment in Hong
Kong. d.
62. Id. Motorola may have suspected ELSCO because some of the scrap
parts sold to ELSCO for smelting had the Motorola registered trademark on
them. Id.
63. Id. Specifically, the corporate manager of precious metals controls for
Motorola contacted the president of ELSCO, requesting ELSCO's permission to
"audit the scrap" that ELSCO had purchased from Motorola. Id. ELSCO per-
mitted Motorola investigators to investigate the ELSCO premises, books and
materials and to take inventory of the scrap. Id. Motorola summarized the re-
sults of the investigation in an inter-office memo, which "compared the amount
of scrap sold to ELSCO with the amount of scrap on the premises or already
smelted." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. ELSCO had 98.05% of the copper scrap and 98.7% of the steel
scrap that it had bought from Motorola on ELSCO premises. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Motorola filed the complaint in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Civ. No. 88-2452). Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 800-01.
70. Id. at 800.
71. Id. at 801. As attorneys for Motorola, defendants Cullen, Hauben and
Wolfson, failed to inform the district court during the ex parte order proceeding
1348 [Vol. 38: p. 1338
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In response to Motorola's actions, ELSCO filed its own complaint
against Motorola and Motorola's attorneys, alleging wrongful seizure
under section 11 16(d)(11) of the Lanham Act.7 2 The district court con-
solidated the ELSCO and Motorola cases. 73 Eventually, ELSCO and
Motorola reached a settlement.7 4 However, ELSCO and Motorola did
not settle ELSCO's claim against Motorola's attorneys. 7 5 This claim
proceeded to court.76 Thus, the defendants in Electronic Laboratory Sup-
ply Co. v. Cullen were the three attorneys who prepared Motorola's appli-
cation for the ex parte seizure. 77
ELSCO believed Motorola's attorneys were liable for wrongful
seizure because the attorneys were aware of, but never informed the dis-
trict court of, the inventories that Motorola had taken at ELSCO's facili-
ties, the reason for Rawls' termination, the compensation Motorola had
paid to Rawls for his affidavit and ELSCO's full cooperation with Motor-
ola during the inspections. 78 The district court rejected ELSCO's argu-
ment that the defendant attorneys were liable for wrongful seizure
under the Lanham Act. 79 Accordingly, the district court granted the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment, determining that section
11 16(d)(11) only creates a cause of action against the applicant for an ex
parte seizure order, not the applicant's attorneys.8 0
The district court concluded that the term applicant, as used in sec-
tion 11 16(d) (11), refers to the trademark owner and not the trademark
owner's attorney. 8 ' In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied
that Motorola had audited ELSCO with ELSCO's full cooperation, that the re-
sults of these audits were that ELSCO could account for 98% of the scrap Mo-
torola had sold to ELSCO to be smelted, and that Motorola paid Rawls $700 for
his affidavit. Id. at 800-01.
72. Id. at 801. ELSCO filed the complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Civ. No. 88-4494). Id. ELSCO
also alleged "antitrust violations, RICO, Rule 11 violations, and various com-





77. 782 F. Supp. 1016, 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Defendant Cullen was a part-
ner in the Philadelphia law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and defendants
Hauben and Wolfson were "present or former associates." Electronic Lab. Supply
Co., 977 F.2d at 799.
78. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 800.
79. 782 F. Supp. at 1020.
80. Id. at 1020.
81. Id. In its opinion, the district court did not refer to the definition of
"applicant" in § 1127 of the Lanham Trademark Act. The district court merely
stated that the term applicant is not defined in § 11 16(d)(l 1). Id. The district
court referred only to the legislative history of § 1116(d). Id. The court also
reviewed the use of applicant in other provisions of the Lanham Act to find that
attorneys are not included in the term applicant. Id. For a discussion of how
the Third Circuit analyzed the term "applicant," see infra notes 98-118 and ac-
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/18
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
on the structure of the Lanham Act and the legislative history concern-
ing amendments to the Act.8 2 In the legislative history, Congress used
the term applicant to describe the plaintiff and did not define applicant
as including the attorney of the applicant.83
ELSCO had asked the district court to reconsider the grant of sum-
mary judgment, asserting that the court had not considered the theory
of aiding and abetting liability as a ground for holding the defendants
liable under section 11 16(d)(11) of the Lanham Act. 84 The district
court refused to reconsider its decision to grant summary judgment in
favor of Motorola. 85 In addressing this issue, the district court looked to
the Third Circuit's established framework for determining the existence
of aiding and abetting liability under federal statutes. 8 6
Additionally, the district court considered Congress' intent in en-
acting section 11 16(d) (1 1), which was to hold an applicant for a wrong-
ful ex parte seizure liable. 8 7 According to the court, the application of
aiding and abetting liability to this section would expand the reach of
companying text. For the relevant text of § 1127 of the Lanham Trademark Act,
see supra note 41-42 and accompanying text.
82. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 782 F. Supp. 1017-20.
83. Id. The district court examined the legislative history of the Lanham
Act amendments: the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Id. at 1018-
20. The district court concluded that the Senate Judiciary Committee used the
term applicant to describe the plaintiff and that the Committee had not further
defined or expanded the term to include the plaintiffis attorney. Id. Further, the
district court noted that the terms "party" and "applicant" are used inter-
changeably in the legislative history, thereby reflecting congressional intent that
an applicant is a party or plaintiff and not the party's attorney. Id.
The district court also examined the interplay of § 11 16(d)(l 1) with other
provisions of the Lanham Act. Id. The court determined that Congress must
not have intended to expand liability under this section because if Congress had,
Congress would have said so in the language of the statute. Id. For example,
the court noted that § 11 16(d)(9) of the Lanham Act explicitly distinguishes be-
tween an "applicant" and his or her agent. Id. Since an attorney is an agent for
a plaintiff, the court found that the term "applicant" in § 11 16(d)(11) did not
include attorneys because the language does not refer to "agents." Id. at 1020.
Therefore, because the court concluded that an attorney cannot be an "appli-
cant" under § 11 16(d)(l 1) of the Lanham Act, consequently, there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact. Id. For the relevant text of § 11 16(d)(9), see infra note
116.
84. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Motorola, 785 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id. at 69. The district court referred to the Third Circuit's decision in
Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of North America, in which the Third Circuit had applied
aiding and abetting liability to a civil RICO statute. Id. In Petro-Tech, the court
considered the purpose and structure of RICO in finding that aiding and abet-
ting liability should be applied. 824 F.2d at 1357 & n.9. For a further discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's legal framework for determining whether aiding and
abetting liability applies to federal statutes, see infra notes 94-97 and accompa-
nying text.
87. 785 F. Supp. at 69.
1350 [Vol. 38: p. 1338
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liability further than Congress intended.8 8 The court concluded that
Congress did not intend for section 11 16(d)(11) liability to apply to an
applicant's attorney because Congress did not explicitly include attor-
neys as applicants in section 11 16(d)(11).89 Thus, the district court con-
cluded that aiding and abetting is not a viable theory of recovery under
the Lanham Act because it does not advance the congressional intent or
purpose of the Act.90
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
and held that the term applicant in section 11 16(d)(l 1) of the Lanham
Trademark Act does not include the attorneys who file the application
for the ex parte seizure. 9 1 In concluding that the term applicant in sec-
tion 11 16(d) (11) does not include attorneys, the Third Circuit declined
to follow the Illinois district court's holding in Gonzalez.9 2 Rather, the
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court found that it was plainly apparent
from the language of section 11 16(d)(1 1) that Congress did not intend
the term applicant to include a party's attorney. 93
The Third Circuit also affirmed the district court's holding that
common-law aiding and abetting liability should not be applied to sec-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The district court found that Congress had intended the applicant
for the ex parte seizure order to be the party that was liable under the wrongful
seizure provision. Id. The court determined that there was no indication that
Congress intended to expand this liability to attorneys of applicants. Id. There-
fore, applying aiding and abetting liability to this provision would unnecessarily
"expand the reach" of the liability beyond that intended by Congress. Id.
Moreover, the district court distinguished Electronic Laboratory Supply Co.
from cases in which courts that applied aiding and abetting on the ground that
the ex parte and wrongful seizure provisions are different from the statutory
causes of action to which courts have traditionally applied aiding and abetting
liability. Id. For example, securities law is based on common law principles of
fraud. Id. Because the tort of fraud recognizes aiding and abetting liability, it is
only natural to apply aiding and abetting liability to securities law. Id. Further-
more, RICO, the statute at issue in Petro-Tech, allows civil recovery for criminal
acts. Id. Courts have always recognized aiding and abetting liability for criminal
offenses. Id. Therefore, because the conduct under § 11 16(d)(1 1) is not similar
to the conduct for which courts have traditionally recognized aiding and abet-
ting liability, and it is not recognized under common law, the district court held
that the imposition of aiding and abetting liability would not advance the pur-
poses of the provision. Id. Thus, the district court held that it could not expand
the reach of the statute to hold additional parties liable when Congress has de-
clined to include these parties. Id.
91. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 801-05 (1992).
92. Id. at 802. The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court found that the Gon-
zalez reasoning was unpersuasive because it was not supported by any analysis.
Id.
93. Id. at 805-08.
1993] 1351
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tion 11 16(d)(11) of the Lanham Act.9 4  The Third Circuit limited the
application of aiding and abetting liability to statutes that provide crimi-
nal or tort remedies and statutes that impose liability on collateral par-
ticipants. 95 Additionally, the court concluded that Congress must not
have intended such common-law liability to be applied under section
11 16(d)(l 1).96 The court reasoned that if Congress had intended for
aiding and abetting liability to be applied under section 11 16(d) (11),
Congress would have explicitly provided for such liability in the lan-
guage of the statute. 9 7
A. The Meaning of "Applicant" Under Section 1116(d)(11)
In Electronic Laboratory Supply Co., the Third Circuit confronted the
issue of whether the term applicant in section 1116(d) (11) of the Lan-
ham Act encompassed Motorola's attorneys. 9 8 The Electronic Laboratory
Supply Co. court began its analysis of this issue by examining the lan-
guage of the statute.9 9 The court compared the provisions that govern
ex parte seizures with the provisions that govern "wrongful"
seizures. 100
First, the Third Circuit examined Congress' purpose in authorizing
applications for ex parte seizures under the Lanham Trademark Act.' 00
The court determined from the language of section 1116(d) (1) (A) that
Congress' purpose was "to protect the property rights of persons likely
to suffer immediate and irreparable harm from such counterfeiting of
their goods or marks."' 1 2 Additionally, the Third Circuit concluded
that the beneficiary of the wrongful seizure provision is the person in-
jured by the trademark infringement.' 0 3 Therefore, the Third Circuit
concluded that those protected by the ex parte seizure provision-trade-
mark owners and not attorneys-are the applicants for such orders.' 0 4
Second, the Third Circuit considered the conditions an applicant
must meet before a court may grant an order for an ex parte seizure.10 5
For example, section 11 16(d)(4)(A) requires a person obtaining an ex
94. Id. at 805. For a further discussion of the principles the Third Circuit
used to limit the applicability of aiding and abetting liability, see infra note 129.
95. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 808.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 806.
98. Id. at 802-05.
99. Id. at 801. The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court noted that this was
an issue of statutory construction, and as such, the court's standard of review
was plenary. Id.
100. Id. at 802-05. For a further discussion of the provisions governing ex
parte seizures, see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
101. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 802.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 803.
105. Id. at 802-03. For the relevant text of § 1116(d), see supra note 32.
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parte seizure order to post a bond to cover possible damages resulting
from a wrongful seizure.10 6 Reading this provision as a counterpart to
section 11 16(d) (11), the Third Circuit determined that "the person ob-
taining an order" in section 11 16(d)(4)(A) and the "applicant" in sec-
tion 11 16(d)(11) must refer to the same person. '0 7 Therefore, the court
reasoned that the applicant must post a bond.'08 The court concluded
that because it is commonly accepted that clients, and not attorneys, are
the persons who pay such bonds, Congress must not have considered
attorneys to be applicants under section 11 16(d)(11). 1o9
Finally, the Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court proceeded to ex-
amine four other requirements that an applicant must meet before a
court may grant an order for an ex parte seizure.I 10 In particular, the
Third Circuit looked to the sections of the Act that provide that a court
cannot grant an ex parte order unless it clearly appears that: 1) no other
remedy would achieve the purpose of protecting the trademark owner's
property rights; 2) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the
defendant used a counterfeit mark; 3) the applicant will incur immediate
and irreparable injury if the court does not grant the order; and 4) the
harm to the applicant outweighs the harm to the person whose goods
are to be seized.'''
106. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 803. Section 11 16(d)(4)(A) pro-
vides that:
The court shall not grant such an application [for. an ex parte
seizure order] unless the person obtaining an order . . . provides the
security determined adequate by the court for the payment of such
damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a
wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(A)).
107. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 803.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 803-04. These provisions are 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(i), (iii),
(iv) and (vi).
111. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 803-05. Specifically,
§ 11 16(d)(4)(B)(i) provides that a court cannot grant an ex parte seizure order
unless it clearly appears that no other order would achieve the purpose of pro-
tecting the rights of the plaintiff whose trademark is infringed. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(d)(4)(B)(i).
Section 11 16(d)(4)(B)(iii) provides that a court cannot grant an ex parte
seizure order unless it "clearly appears that the applicant is likely to succeed in
showing" that the defendant was counterfeiting his or her trademark. 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 16(d)(4)(B)(iii). This section demonstrates that the party who is to "suc-
ceed in showing" the counterfeiting activity bears the burden of proof. Electronic.
Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 803.
Section 11 16(d)(4)(B)(iv) provides that a court cannot grant an application
for an ex parte order unless the applicant demonstrates that "immediate and
irreparable injury will occur" if it is denied. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(iv).
Lastly, § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(vi) provides that it must clearly appear that the harm
to the applicant if the court denies the application for the ex parte seizure is
greater than the harm to the interests of the person against whom the seizure is
sought. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(vi).
16
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The Third Circuit reasoned that these requirements demonstrated
congressional intent to regard only the trademark owner as an applicant
for the ex parte seizure order."12 The Third Circuit found that an at-
torney's property rights are not protected by the ex parte seizure provi-
sion. 1 3 A party, not the party's attorney, has the burden of proving
success." 1 4 Also, an attorney cannot be injured by a violation of the Act
and as such cannot show immediate and irreparable injury that is greater
than the person's whose goods might be seized." 15
The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court also noted that Congress
had distinguished between applicants and those who act on the appli-
cant's behalf elsewhere in the statutory provisions governing ex parte
seizures.' 16 For example, the court noted that section 1116(d)(9) pro-
vides that a court may issue an ex parte seizure order to protect a party
from "undue damage" resulting from disclosure of confidential infor-
mation, "including, where appropriate, orders restricting the access of
the applicant (or any agent or employee of the applicant)" to the infor-
mation. 11 7 The court found this distinction between applicants and
agents to be evidence of Congress' intent to exclude attorneys from the
definition of applicant in section 11 16(d)(l 1). 118




116. Id. at 803-04. The Third Circuit, like the district court in Electronic
Laboratory Supply Co., noted that § 11 16(d)(9) expressly distinguishes between an
applicant and his or her agent. Id. at 804. The relevant text of § 11 16(d)(9)
provides that:
The court shall issue orders, when appropriate, to protect the de-
fendant from undue damage from the disclosure of trade secrets or
other confidential information during the course of the seizure, includ-
ing, where appropriate, orders restricting the access of the applicant
(or any agent or employee of the applicant) to such secrets or informa-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(9)(emphasis added).
117. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 804.
118. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the use of the term "agent" in
§ 11 16(d)(9) includes attorneys, who are agents for their clients, and the distinc-
tion between applicants and agents in this section shows congressional intent to
differentiate between an applicant and his or her attorney. Id. at 804-05. As
such, the Third Circuit found that Congress would have expressly mentioned
the terms applicant and attorney in § 11 16(d)(1 1), as in § 11 16(d)(9), if it had
intended for liability to apply to an applicant and an attorney under
§ 1116(d)(l 1). Id. at 804.
The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court did not examine the legislative his-
tory of § 1116(d) (11) because it found that the language of the Lanham Act sug-
gests that there is no cause of action against attorneys. Id. (citing Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (holding that when court is resolving ques-
tion of federal law court should look first to statutory langauage and then, if
language of law unclear, to legislative history)).
1354 [Vol. 38: p. 1338
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B. Aiding and Abetting Under Section 11 16(d)(1 1)
After the Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court concluded that attor-
neys are not applicants under section 11 16(d) (11), the court addressed
the issue of whether attorneys could be liable for aiding and abetting a
wrongful ex parte seizure." t9 While the courts have traditionally ap-
plied aiding and abetting liability to criminal cases, courts have also ap-
plied the theory to federal civil statutes in some cases. 120 In the
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. case, ELSCO argued that even if an attor-
ney is not an applicant under section 11 16(d) (11), an attorney should
still be liable under the common-law theory of aiding and abetting if
there has been a wrongful ex parte seizure. 12 1
To resolve this issue, the Third Circuit referred to Petro-Tech, Inc. v.
Western Co. of North America, 12 2 in which it had outlined a general frame-
work for determining when aiding and abetting liability can be a theory
of civil recovery under a federal statute. 123 The Petro-Tech framework
applies common-law aiding and abetting liability when such liability ad-
vances the goals of a particular statute and when the structure and text
of the statute indicate congressional intent to impose such liability. 124
In Petro-Tech, the court applied aiding and abetting liability to a civil
RICO action because courts had commonly applied such liability to
federal criminal offenses under the same statute for the same
misconduct. 125
In contrast, the Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court noted that the
Lanham Trademark Act is a purely civil statute.126 Unlike federal crimi-
nal law, the purpose behind federal civil law does not automatically
suggest that it would be appropriate to impose aiding and abetting lia-
119. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 805. This was a question of first
impression. Id.
120. Id. at 805-06. For instance, the Third Circuit has applied aiding and
abetting liability to federal civil statutes for civil RICO violations, and also to
§ 10(b) and § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Id.; see, e.g.,
Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987)(imposing
aiding and abetting liability under federal civil RICO statute); Monsen v. Con-
solidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930
(1978)(recognizing aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 of
S.E.C. Act of 1934); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1976)(finding aiding and abetting liability cause of action under § 14(a) and
Rule 14a-9 of S.E.C. Act of 1934).
121. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 805.
122. 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987).
123. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 805.
124. Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1357-61.
125. Id. at 1357-58. The Petro-Tech court found clearly-expressed congres-
sional intent that aiding and abetting liability apply to the criminal RICO statute
at issue, and as such, the court reasoned that it logically follows that such liabil-
ity should apply to civil actions under the same statute. Id.
126. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 805.
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bility.127 In the present case, the court did not find evidence of congres-
sional intent to impose aiding and abetting liability under the Lanham
Trademark Act, nor did it find that imposing such liability would ad-
vance the goals of the Act. 128
After it considered the Petro-Tech framework, the Third Circuit pro-
ceeded to apply the principles of another Third Circuit case, Craftmatic
Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow. 12 9 The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court
applied the Craftmatic principle that where the language of a statute lim-
its liability to a narrow class of defendants, imposing aiding and abetting
liability frustrates congressional intent.13 0 Thus, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that because the Lanham Act contains detailed rules and proce-
dures for a very specific cause of action-wrongful use of ex parte
seizures-and expressly imposes liability on only a small class of defend-
ants, it is inappropriate for a court to apply a common-law doctrine such
as aiding and abetting liability.' 3 1 Imposing such liability would "cir-
cumvent the express intent of Congress," which was to prohibit only
specific conduct and impose liability on a precise group. 132 Therefore,
based on the text and legislative history of the Lanham Trademark Act,
the Third Circuit in Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. did not find evidence
of congressional intent to impose aiding and abetting liability against
127. Id. at 805. The Third Circuit noted that the Lanham Act is a federal
civil statute, and, unlike federal criminal law, there is no presumption of aiding
and abetting liability. Id. Further, the Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court noted
a trend toward a more cautious approach in determining the scope of aiding and
abetting liability under federal civil statutes. Id. at 806 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622 (1988))(refusing to extend liability under S.E.C. Act of 1933 where
language imposing liability was narrowly tailored to specific group).
128. Id. at 808.
129. Crafimatic, 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989). The Electronic Laboratory Supply
Co. court applied the following principles: 1) where language of a section ex-
pressly limits liability to certain defendants; 2) the statute directs that liability
does not extend to collateral participants; and 3) the remedy is not analogous to
criminal or tort law. Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 636-37.
130. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 806 (citing In re Equity Corp. of
Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976)).
131. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 808. The Third Circuit found
that § 11 16(d)(l 1) limits liability for wrongful seizure to the applicant for the
order and the statute is silent regarding any form of collateral liability, including
liability for aiding and abetting. Id. at 807. Furthermore, as compared to vari-
ous federal statutes to which courts have applied aiding and abetting liability,
§ 11 16(d)(l 1) does not have broad provisions imposing liability on any person
involved in the crime. Id. In contrast to the Lanham Trademark Act, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934, under which courts have applied aiding and abet-
ting liability, imposes liability on anyone offering or selling securities or
soliciting proxies. Id.
132. Id. at 806-07. Moreover, "where a federal, civil statute like
§ 11 16(d)(l 1) expressly imposes liability on only a small class of defendants for
specific misconduct, it is inappropriate for a court to apply common law doc-
trines to write a new cause of action into that statute." Id. at 806 (citing In re
Equity Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976)).
1356 [Vol. 38: p. 1338
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the defendants for wrongful seizure under section 1116(d) (11). 133
V. CONCLUSION
In Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen, the Third Circuit refused
to impose liability upon a trademark owner's attorney because doing so
would not further the congressional intent and purpose of section
11 16(d)(11) of the Lanham Trademark Act. 13 4 The court believed that
it was not necessary to extend liability under the Act and recognize a
cause of action against a party's attorney under section 11 16(d)(11) be-
cause victims of a wrongful ex parte seizure are sufficiently protected by
other means.1 35 First, the court noted that the party whose goods were
wrongfully seized may sue the applicant under section 11 16(d)(11) and
then the applicant may implead his or her attorney for legal malprac-
tice.' 3 6 Second, the court stated that a party whose goods were wrong-
133. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 806-08. The Third Circuit held
that even though applying aiding and abetting liability might deter some wrong-
ful seizures and compensate some victims, Congress could have provided for
aiding and abetting in § 11 16(d)(l 1) when the section was drafted if it had in-
tended for aiding and abetting liability to be imposed by this section. Id. at 807.
The Third Circuit found that Congress' intent in providing a cause of action
against an applicant in a wrongful seizure action was to "provide a limited sup-
plement to available common law and statutory remedies, without authorizing
suits against many different persons on an issue normally collateral to the sub-
ject matter of a trademark infringement action." Id. Even if the Third Circuit
had found such liability to further the purpose of § 11 16(d)(l 1), the Third Cir-
cuit was unwilling to impose the liability absent some evidence of Congressional
intent to do so. id.
The plaintiffs in Electronic Laboratoy Supply Co. also argued that common law
aiding and abetting liability could be applied pursuant to the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 808. The
Third Circuit noted that courts have used the Restatement to impose aiding and
abetting liability in civil actions under federal statutes that already impose aiding
and abetting liability. Id. The court distinguished these cases as civil actions
under federal criminal statutes to which common-law aiding and abetting al-
ready applied. Id. at 808. Therefore, the court held that because § 11 16(d)(11)
is not analogous to a common-law tort, aiding and abetting liability cannot be
applied "absent any statutory basis for doing so." Id.
134. Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 804, 806-07. The Third Circuit in
Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. believed that it was apparent that Congress had
not intended the term applicant in § 11 16(d)(l 1) to include legal representa-
tives. Id. at 804-05. Further, the Third Circuit found that imposing aiding and
abetting liability under § 11 16(d)(11) would require writing new causes of action
into the Lanham Act. Id. Even if this would further the statute's purpose, there
is no evidence that Congress intended such an expansion of the scope of liability
under § 1116(d)(11). Id. at 806-08.
135. Id. at 805.
136. Id. The Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court found it unnecessary to
extend liability to attorneys under § 11 16(d)(l 1) because a victim of wrongful ex
parte seizure can obtain relief through a cause of action for wrongful seizure, in
which the victim sues the applicant, and the applicant impleads his attorney for
legal malpractice. Id. Such an approach was impossible under the facts of Elec-
tronic Laboratory Supply Co., however, because ELSCO had previously settled with
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fully seized may bring a cause of action against the other party's attorney
under the theories of conversion, wrongful use of civil procedure and
trespass.' 3 7 Thus, the Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. court concluded
that adequate disincentives existed to prevent attorneys from filing
wrongful ex parte seizures.
Some very important issues are raised by the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. Despite the Electronic Laboratory Sup-
ply Co. court's self-proclaimed goal of furthering congressional intent,
there is no evidence of congressional intent to protect an attorney who
misused, perhaps even knowingly, the ex parte seizure provision. To
the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that Congress intended
that courts and litigants utilize ex parte seizures sparingly to prevent
misuse, which arguably occurred in Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. 138
Moreover, when articulating the alternate methods of recovery for a
victim of a wrongful ex parte seizure, the Third Circuit failed to consider
that when an attorney has done exactly what a client has told him or her
to do, the applicant cannot bring a cause of action for malpractice liabil-
ity against the attorney. Additionally, if an applicant's attorney wrong-
fully suggests an ex parte seizure remedy, the client, unaware of the
provisions governing ex parte seizures, will be held liable by the victim
with no guarantee of recovery against the attorney. Therefore, the alter-
natives that the Third Circuit enumerated are somewhat illusory.
Finally, by refusing to extend section 11 16(d)(l 1) liability to attor-
neys under the definition of applicant or to extend liability to attorneys
by applying common-law aiding and abetting liability, the Electronic Labo-
ratory Supply Co. court may have perpetuated something that Congress
never intended-routine or casual seizures. 139 After Electronic Laboratory
Supply Co., an attorney may make common use of the ex parte seizure
Motorola and had only preserved its claims against Motorola's attorneys. Id. at
805 n.2.
137. Id. at 805.
138. See Slazengers v. Stoller, No. 88-C-3722, 1988 WL 58579, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. May 31, 1988) (finding representations made to obtain ex parte seizure order
"hyperbolic" and not in accordance with congressional intent to use remedy in
only extraordinay circumstances); see also S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 7,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3633 (recognizing that courts must employ ex
parte seizures with caution and that all protections afforded by Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are incorporated into provision in addition to specific protec-
tions provided in Act); H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 6 (1984) (recogniz-
ing that ex parte seizure must be limited to "only the most egregious conduct,
[o]therwise, current civil provisions of the Federal law are adequate to deal with
such conduct"). One commentator has discussed that as a practical matter,
many courts will not grant ex parte relief except in the most compelling circum-
stances. See Louis P. Petrich, Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Or-
ders in Copyrights and Trademark Infringement Cases: The Trademark Counterfeiting Act,
in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY 13 (1992).
139. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 526, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3634 (emphasizing that courts must not employ ex parte
seizures routinely or casually); see also H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 10, at 25
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provision in trademark infringement cases without fear of incurring lia-
bility under the Lanham Trademark Act.
Alison T Fiala
(noting good faith is no defense for plaintiff who initiated wrongful ex parte
seizure).
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